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ii.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

Jermey Flores Sanchez appeals from the district court's Order Granting State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal filed July 22, 2013, of his successive petition for post
conviction, and the Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, and Final Judgement thereon.
(R., pp. 204-211, 212-213). Mr. Sanchez further appeals the District Court's Order
denying his Motion for Reconsider, said Order filed August 15, 2013 (R., pp. 231-233
Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief and by failing to reconsider its dismissal.
B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings

Mr. Sanchez was convicted originally in Canyon County Case CR-02-5737 of
conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping,
aggravated battery and aiding and abetting attempted murder. (R., p. 204). He was
sentenced to a unified minimum term of life on each of the first four counts, in addition

to a unified term of fifteen years fixed, with no years indeterminate, on each of the
convictions for aggravated battery and aiding and abetting attempted murder. (R. p.

204). The district court ordered that all sentences were to run consecutively. (R., p.

204). Mr. Sanchez appealed, but his case was affirmed, including the length of his
sentence. (R., p. 204). Mr. Sanchez filed a first petition for post-conviction relief in
2006. (R., p. 204). That petition was denied, and its denial was affirmed on appeal.

(R., p. 204).
On March 14, 2013, the petitioner, Mr. Sanchez, filed the instant Petition and
Affidavit for Successive Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp. 4-7). The Petition was verified
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(R., p. 7). The Petition was also supported by an Affidavit Of Facts filed March 14,
2013. (R., pp. 23-24). In addition, the affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, counsel on Mr.

Sanchez's first appeal, was filed in support of Mr. Sanchez's petition on April 5, 2013.
(R., pp. 21-32, 150-154).

In his petition, Mr. Sanchez claimed the following:

a} General Claims:

a. Newly discovered evidence, including an affidavit from Kenneth

Wurdemann in which Mr. Wurdemann testified that he perjured himself
during Mr. Sanchez's trial.

b. Misconduct and/or witness tampering on the part of the prosecutor by
using Mr. Wurdemann's perjured testimony.

c. The State used evidence it knew was false or misleading when it procured
Mr. Wurdemann's testimony.
d. The State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.CT. 1194 (1963),

by using said testimony.
b). Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not raise
the following issues on appeal.

a. The trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to impose a 30
year consecutive sentence;

b. The fixed life term was unlawfully imposed and the trial court was
2

without subject matter to impose such sentences;

c. the substantive crimes merge, and therefore, the consecutive
sentences for those crimes violate the Double Jeopardy clause of the US
Constitution;

d. First post-conviction counsel was ineffective and said ineffective
assistance of counsel was never addressed because the State Appellate
Public Defender would not render ineffective assistance of counsel in a

direct appeal, and because of the appellate representation, Mr. Sanchez
could not file his own documents as prose, thus denying counsel in his
direct appellate review; and,

e. First post-conviction counsel failed to file an appeal.

(R., pp. 4-7).

On May 30, 2013, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal, alleging that
the successive petition was untimely and therefore time barred, and that it did not raise

a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp. 177-202). The district court granted the state's
motion via its Order filed July 22, 2013. (R., pp. 204-211 ). Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to
reconsider on August 5, 2013 (R., 218-226). The district court denied Mr. Sanchez's
motion via order filed August 15, 2013. (R., pp. 231-232). Mr. Sanchez timely
appealed. (R., pp. 227-228, 234-235).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
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A.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Sanchez's
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and denied Mr.
Sanchez's Motion to Reconsder?

B.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sanchez's Motion to
Reconsder?

Ill.ARGUMENT
A.

A.

The District Court Erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Sanchez's
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a
successive petition, and denied Mr. Sanchez's Motion to Reconsder.

A petition for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d
798, 802 (2007). Under Idaho Code§ 19-4903, the petitioner must prove the claims
upon which the petition is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Workman, 144
Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.

A claim for post-conviction relief must be raised in an original application. I.C. §
19-4908. That application must be filed within one year from the expiration of the time
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a
proceeding following an appeal, whichever proceeding is later. I.C. § 19-4902.
Successive petitions are impermissible "unless the court finds a ground for relief
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908.

Section 19-4908 sets forth no fixed time within which successive petitions may be
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filed, however, the "sufficient reason" language in the statute necessarily provides "a
reasonable time within which such claims [may be] asserted in a successive postconviction petition, once those claims are known." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,
905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). The determination of what is a reasonable time is
considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id.

An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,

142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, a petitioner asserting
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient reason" for
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a
two-level burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in
the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought. See Workman, 144 Idaho at
522, 164 P.3d at 802.

Summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when the applicant's
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual
issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho
517,518,960 P.2d 738,739 (1998); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d

241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163
5

(Ct. App. 1991).

On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleading, deposition, and admissions together with any affidavits on file.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).
1. Mr. Sanchez's contends his Petition should have been allowed under I.C. 194901 and I.C. 19-408 and not been summarily dismissed due to the existence of a
genuine issue of fact.
Mr. Sanchez's contends that the district court erred by failing to allow his petition
under I.C. § 19-4901 and 19-4908, and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174
P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Mr. Sanchez argues that he has made a substantial factual
showing that his claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability the court
process given the affidavits submitted in support of his petition, and the verified
statements within his petition. Further, mindful of the fact that an earlier affidavit from
Mr. Wurdemann existed concerning perjury, Mr. Sanchez contends that the differences
between the two petitions, along with the issues involved including subject matter
jurisdiction. work to allow a timely successive petition under I.C. § 19-4901 and 19-

4908.
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action . . . provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were
inadequately presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction
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relief." Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P .3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005).

Mr. Sanchez contends that he raised substantial facts in his verified petition, the
affidiavit of Mr. Wurdemann executed in 2011, and the affidavit of his former appellate
counsel, Dennis Benjmin, concerning newly discovered evidence regarding perjured

testimony at this trial, and the fact that his other underlying claims were not adequately
presented previously, nor was his original appeal effective.
As a result, his claims were either due to new evidence, or were not adequately
presented as discussed in Charboneau and Baker.

Further, Mr. Sanchez contends that he did not have access to legal resources
nor assistance of counsel as he could not reach his attorney and did not receive
communication from his attorney, and that for that additional reason, his arguments
were not presented adequately previously. (R., p. 9-10).

Mr. Sanchez presented his affidavit of facts supporting his petition setting forth
the facts regarding the newly disovered evidence in the form of the 2011 Affidavit of Mr.
Wurdemann, which Mr. Sanchez received in February of 2013. (R., p. 23). Further, Mr.
Dennis Benjami~ provided an affidavit that in part notes the claims regarding perjured
testimony and prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised in the prior postconviction because of the newly discovered evidence in the form of the Wurdemann
affidavit that was not possessed or fully known at that time.

(R., pp. 151-152).

Moreover, the affidavit of Gerald Wolff disputes the facts as alleged in the Wurdemann
affidavit, creating a materially disputed fact. ((R., pp. 117-119).
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As stated above, summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when
the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved
in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131
Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Ct. App. 1991).

On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits on file.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).

Mr. Sanchez contends that he raised substantial facts in his pleadings as
detailed above, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claims. It is further
Mr. Sanchez's contention that because he raised such claims, and supported them with
the facts in his pleadings, that summary dismissal, and the failure to reconsider or alter
said dismissal upon his motion, was error.

2.

Mr. Sanchez contends that the district court erred by dismissing _hi~

claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and subject matter jurisdiction as
untimely.

8

Mr. Sanchez contends that the district court erred when it dismissed his
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel and subject matter jurisdiction claims as
time barred.

Questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal

See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223. 227, 91 P.3d 1127. 1131 (2004). Further, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction ca be raised in a Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence that can be raised at any time. See, State
252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011).

v.

Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840,

Mr. Sanchez also argues that the double jeopardy

violation alleged could have been raised under the fundamental error in existence at
the time of the direct appeal. In 2005, "fundamental error" included such error as would
go to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or would go to the foundation of the
case or takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense which no court ought to
permit him to waive. State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918-19, 854 P.2d 259 (1993),

abrogated by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 2454 P.3d 961 (2010).
In addition, the Brady violations alleged and prosecutorial misconduct claim were
not properly presented previously and therefore should be allowed in a successive
petition.

An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-

conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005); See Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S.
_, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316-18 (2012).
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. SANCHEZ'S
MOTION TO RECONSDER.
Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order summarily

dismissing his post-conviction claims, because he did not have effective access to
counsel and because he filed his petition within a timely period after receiving the new

affidavit, an affidavit that contained different facts from the original 2009 affidavit. The
remaining arguments in favor of his contentions regarding the district court's erroneous
failure to grant his motion to reconsider are set forth above and need not be repeated
here. They are instead incorporated herein by this reference.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and denying his
motion to reconsider, and remand the matter for further hearings.

DATED this b~day of May, 2014.

ST PHEN D. THOMPSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisf1_ day of May, 2014, I served a true and
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Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
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Post Office Box 83720
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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